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THE PRINCE by
Nicolo Machiavelli
Written c. 1505, published 1515. Translated by W. K.
Marriott. Source text in the public domain. This edition © 1998 William J. Ball |
| What is it that Machiavelli has to offer as
a gift? |
[1] DEDICATION |
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[2] To the Magnificent
Lorenzo Di Piero De' Medici: |
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[3] Those who strive to
obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed to come before him with such things as
they hold most precious, or in which they see him take most delight; whence one often sees
horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments presented to princes,
worthy of their greatness. |
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[4] Desiring therefore to
present myself to your Magnificence with some testimony of my devotion towards you, I have
not found among my possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so much as,
the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by long experience in contemporary
affairs, and a continual study of antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great
and prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to your Magnificence. |
| Will this be a technical work? |
[5] And although I may
consider this work unworthy of your countenance, nevertheless I trust much to your
benignity that it may be acceptable, seeing that it is not possible for me to make a
better gift than to offer you the opportunity of understanding in the shortest time all
that I have learnt in so many years, and with so many troubles and dangers; which work I
have not embellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with rounded periods,
nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments whatever, with which so many are
accustomed to embellish their works; for I have wished either that no honour should be
given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the weightiness of the theme shall make
it acceptable. |
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[6] Nor do I hold with those
who regard it as a presumption if a man of low and humble condition dare to discuss and
settle the concerns of princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes place
themselves below in the plain to contemplate the nature of the mountains and of lofty
places, and in order to contemplate the plains place themselves upon high mountains, even
so to understand the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to understand that
if princes it needs to be of the people. |
| What does Machivelli want? |
[7] Take then, your
Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I send it; wherein, if it be
diligently read and considered by you, you will learn my extreme desire that you should
attain that greatness which fortune and your other attributes promise. And if your
Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will sometimes turn your eyes to these
lower regions, you will see how unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of
fortune. |
| What specific types of states is
Machiavelli addressing in this essay? |
[8] CHAPTER I HOW MANY KINDS
OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED |
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[9] ALL STATES, all powers,
that have held and hold rule over men have been and are either republics or
principalities. |
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[10] Principalities are
either hereditary, in which the family has been long established; or they are new. |
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[11] The new are either
entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they are, as it were, members annexed
to the hereditary state of the prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples
to that of the King of Spain. |
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[12] Such dominions thus
acquired are either accustomed to live under a prince, or to live in freedom; and are
acquired either by the arms of the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by
ability. |
| Why are these states easier to keep? |
[13] CHAPTER II CONCERNING
HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES |
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[14] I WILL leave out all
discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another place I have written of them at length,
[1] and will address myself only to principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order
indicated above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved. |
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[15] I say at once there are
fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states, and those long accustomed to the family
of their prince, than new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of
his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, for a prince of
average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he be deprived of it by some
extraordinary and excessive force; and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever
anything sinister happens to the usurper, he will regain it. |
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[16] We have in Italy, for
example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have withstood the attacks of the Venetians in
'84, nor those of Pope Julius in '10, unless he had been long established in his
dominions. For the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it
happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated,
it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him;
and in the antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for
change are lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another. |
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[17] 1. Discourses. |
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[18] CHAPTER III CONCERNING
MIXED PRINCIPALITIES |
| Why? |
[19] BUT the difficulties
occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a
member of a state which, taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise
chiefly from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for men
change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope induces them to
take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards
find by experience they have gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural
and common necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted
to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon his new
acquisition. |
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[20] In this way you have
enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing that principality, and you are not
able to keep those friends who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy
them in the way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them, feeling
bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in entering a
province one has always need of the goodwill of the natives. |
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[21] For these reasons Louis
XII, King of France, quickly occupied Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out
the first time it only needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the
gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit, would not
endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is very true that, after acquiring
rebellious provinces a second time, they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the
prince, with little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the
delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the weakest places.
Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico to
raise insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was
necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be defeated and
driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above mentioned. |
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[22] Nevertheless Milan was
taken from France both the first and the second time. The general reasons for the first
have been discussed; it remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources he
had, and what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more
securely in his acquisition than did the King of France. |
| What must be done? |
[23] Now I say that those
dominions which, when acquired, are added to an ancient state by him who acquires them,
are either of the same country and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier
to hold them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; and to
hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the prince who was ruling
them; because the two peoples, preserving in other things the old conditions, and not
being unlike in customs, will live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany,
Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and,
although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and
the people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has annexed them, if
he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the
family of their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their
taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one body with
the old principality. |
| What must be done in new acquisitions? |
[24] But when states are
acquired in a country differing in language, customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and
good fortune and great energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most
real helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside there. This would
make his position more secure and durable, as it has made that of the Turk in Greece, who,
notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not
settled there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot,
disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one is not
at hand, they heard of only when they are one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the
country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse
to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing to
be otherwise, to fear him. He who would attack that state from the outside must have the
utmost caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested from him with
the greatest difficulty. |
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[25] The other and better
course is to send colonies to one or two places, which may be as keys to that state, for
it necessary either to do this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and
infantry. A prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can
send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the citizens from
whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new inhabitants; and those whom he
offends, remaining poor and scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being
uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it
should happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, I say
that these colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the
injured, as has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to
remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge
themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury
that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of
revenge. |
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[26] But in maintaining
armed men there in place of colonies one spends much more, having to consume on the
garrison all income from the state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many
more are exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting of the
garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and all become hostile, and they
are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every
reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a colony is useful. |
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[27] Again, the prince who
holds a country differing in the above respects ought to make himself the head and
defender of his powerful neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking
care that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footing there;
for it will always happen that such a one will be introduced by those who are
discontented, either through excess of ambition or through fear, as one has seen already.
The Romans were brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other country where
they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And the usual course of
affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject states
are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in
respect to these subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over to
himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He
has only to take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much authority,
and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more
powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does not
properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold
it he will have endless difficulties and troubles. |
| Note the Roman formula. |
[28] The Romans, in the
countries which they annexed, observed closely these measures; they sent colonies and
maintained friendly relations with the minor powers, without increasing their strength;
they kept down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority.
Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and Aetolians were kept
friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the
merits of the Achaeans and Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase their
power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends without
first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make them agree that he should
retain any lordship over the country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all
prudent princes ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future
ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to
remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time
because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physicians say it
happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but
difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either detected or treated
in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. Thus it happens in
affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given
to a wise man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been
foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them. there is
no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once,
and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war is not
to be avoided, but is only put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to
fight with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could
have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which is for
ever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:-- Let us enjoy the benefits of the time
-- but rather the benefits of their own valour and prudence, for time drives everything
before it, and is able to bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good. |
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[29] But let us turn to
France and inquire whether she has done any of the things mentioned. I will speak of Louis
[XII] (and not of Charles [VIII]) as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed,
he having held possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he has
done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a state composed of
divers elements. |
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[30] King Louis was brought
into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who desired to obtain half the state of
Lombardy by his intervention. I will not blame the course taken by the king, because,
wishing to get a foothold in Italy, and having no friends there -- seeing rather that
every door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles -- he was forced to accept
those friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded very quickly in his
design if in other matters he had not made some mistakes. The king, however, having
acquired Lombardy, regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded;
the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the
Bentivoglio, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of
Piombino, the Lucchesi, the Pisans, the Sienese -- everybody made advances to him to
become his friend. Then could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by
them, which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king
master of two-thirds of Italy. |
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[31] Let any one now
consider with what little difficulty the king could have maintained his position in Italy
had he observed the rules above laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected;
for although they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church,
some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to stand in with him,
and by their means he could easily have made himself secure against those who remained
powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope
Alexander to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was
weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and those who had thrown themselves into
his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much temporal power to the spiritual,
thus giving it great authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to
follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent
his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy. |
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[32] And as if it were not
enough to have aggrandized the Church, and deprived himself friends, he, wishing to have
the kingdom of Naples, divides it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime
arbiter of Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and the
malcontents of his own should have where to shelter; and whereas he could have left in the
kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able to
drive him, Louis, out in turn. |
| What is the difference between praiseworthy
and blameworthy ambition? |
[33] The wish to acquire is
in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when they can, and for this they
will be praised not blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means,
then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with her
own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she ought not to have divided
it. And if the partition which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by
the excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for
it had not the excuse of that necessity. |
| Note summary of adivce. |
[34] Therefore Louis made
these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, he increased the strength of one of the
greater powers in Italy, he brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country,
he did not send colonies. Which errors, if he had lived, were not enough to injure him had
he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the Venetians; because, had he not
aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable
and necessary to humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have
consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have kept off others from
designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented except to become
masters themselves there; also because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from
France in order to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not
have had the courage. |
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[35] And if any one should
say: King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war, I
answer for the reasons given above that a blunder ought never be perpetrated to avoid war,
because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And if another
should allege the pledge which the king had given to the Pope that he would assist him in
the enterprise, in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage and for the hat to Rouen,
to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, and how it
ought to be kept. |
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[36] Thus King Louis lost
Lombardy by not having followed any of the conditions observed by those who have taken
possession of countries and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but
much that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes with
Rouen, when Valentino, [1] as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was usually
called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen observing to me that the Italians did
not understand war, I replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft,
meaning that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such greatness. And
in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been
caused by France, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is
drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming powerful
is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about either by astuteness or else
by force, and both are distrusted by him who has been raised to power. |
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[37] 1. So called -- in
Italian -- from the duchy of Valentinois, conferred on him by Louis XII. |
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[38] CHAPTER IV WHY THE
KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF
ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH |
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[39] CONSIDERING the
difficulties which men have had to hold a newly acquired state, some might wonder how,
seeing that Alexander the Great became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst
it was yet scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would
have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained themselves, and had to meet no
other difficulty than that which arose among themselves from their own ambitions. |
| Note two means of ruling. |
[40] I answer that the
principalities of which one has record are found to be governed in two different ways:
either by a prince, with a body of servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as
ministers by his favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity
by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons have states and
their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold them in natural affection. Those
states that are governed by a prince and his servants hold their prince in more
consideration, because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as superior to
him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and official, and
they do not bear him any particular affection. |
| Apply to the examples of Turkey and
France--what is the determining factor in the ease of rule? |
[41] The examples of these
two governments in our time are the Turk and the King of France. The entire monarchy of
the Turk is governed by one lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom
into sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he
chooses. But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body of lords,
acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives,
nor can the king take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both of
these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk, but, once
it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the
kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the
kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the
lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his ministers, being
all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect
little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people
with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that
he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the
revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the field in
such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of
the prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having
no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them before his victory,
so he ought not to fear them after it. |
|
[42] The contrary happens in
kingdoms governed like that of France, because one can easily enter there by gaining over
some baron of the kingdom, for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change.
Such men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the victory
easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with infinite difficulties, both
from those who have assisted you and from those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you
to have exterminated the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make
themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either to
satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings the opportunity. |
|
[43] Now if you will
consider what was the nature of the government of Darius, you will find it similar to the
kingdom of the Turk, and therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow
him in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which victory, Darius being
killed, the state remained secure to Alexander, for the above reasons. And if his
successors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for
there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves. |
|
[44] But it is impossible to
hold with such tranquillity states constituted like that of France. Hence arose those
frequent rebellions against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many
principalities there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them
endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the power and long
continuance of the empire the memory of them passed away, and the Romans then became
secure possessors. And when fighting afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to
attach to himself his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed
there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other than the Romans
were acknowledged. |
| What two factors determine success? |
[45] When these things are
remembered no one will marvel at the ease with which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or
at the difficulties which others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many
more; this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror, but
by the want of uniformity in the subject state. |
|
[46] CHAPTER V CONCERNING
THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY
WERE ANNEXED |
| Which is the most desirable means of
ruling? |
[47] WHENEVER those states
which have been acquired as stated have been accustomed to live under their own laws and
in freedom, there are three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin
them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live under
their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an oligarchy which will keep
it friendly to you. Because such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it
cannot stand without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support him; and
therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the
means of its own citizens than in any other way. |
|
[48] There are, for example,
the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes, establishing there an
oligarchy, nevertheless they lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and
Numantia, dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as the
Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did not succeed. So to hold
it they were compelled to dismantle many cities in the country, for in truth there is no
safe way to retain them otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a
city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for
in rebellion it has always the watch-word of liberty and its ancient privileges as a
rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And what
ever you may do or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges unless
they are disunited or dispersed but at every chance they immediately rally to them, as
Pisa after the hundred years she had been held in bondage by the Florentines. |
| What do you think Machiavelli is really
advising here? |
[49] But when cities or
countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and his family is exterminated, they,
being on the one hand accustomed to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince,
cannot agree in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern
themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a prince can gain them
to himself and secure them much more easily. But in republics there is more vitality,
greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the
memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or to
reside there. |
| What are the advantages of acquiring states
by force? |
[50] CHAPTER VI CONCERNING
NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY |
|
[51] LET no one be surprised
if, in speaking of entirely new principalities as I shall do, I adduce the highest
examples both of prince and of state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten
by others, and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to the
ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A wise man ought always to
follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so that
if his ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the
clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far distant, and
knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much higher than
the mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able
with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach. |
|
[52] I say, therefore, that
in entirely new principalities, where there is a new prince, more or less difficulty is
found in keeping them, accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has
acquired the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station
presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of these two things
will mitigate in some degree many difficulties. Nevertheless, he who has relied least on
fortune is established the strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince,
having no other state, is compelled to reside there in person. |
|
[53] But to come to those
who, by their own ability and not through fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that
Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and such like are the most excellent examples. And
although one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet
he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy to speak with God.
But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be
found admirable; and if their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will
not be found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. And in
examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to fortune beyond
opportunity, which brought them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to
them. Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and
without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain. |
| What role did fate versus ability play for
these rulers? |
[54] It was necessary,
therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of Israel in Egypt enslaved and
oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that they should be disposed to follow him so as to
be delivered out of bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and
that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become King of Rome and
founder of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus should find the Persians
discontented with the government of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through
their long peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians
dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, and their high
ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and
made famous. |
|
[55] Those who by valorous
ways become princes, like these men, acquire a principality with difficulty, but they it
with ease. The difficulties they have in acquiring it arise in part from the new rules and
methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their government and its security.
And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more
perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the
introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who
have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well
under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws
on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new
things until they have had a long experience of them. Thus it happens that whenever those
who are hostile have the opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the
others defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along with them. It
is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter thoroughly, to inquire
whether these innovators can rely on themselves or have to depend on others: that is to
say, whether, to consummate their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use
force? In the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass anything; but
when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely endangered. Hence it
is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed.
Besides the reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy
to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is necessary
to take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them
believe by force. |
| What does Machiavelli think of depending on
others? |
[56] If Moses, Cyrus,
Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not have enforced their constitutions for
long -- as happened in our time to Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new
order of things immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no means
of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the unbelievers to believe. Therefore
such as these have great difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all their
dangers are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when these are
overcome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated, they will begin to be
respected, and they will continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy. |
|
[57] To these great examples
I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some resemblance to them, and I wish it to
suffice me for all of a like kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan. This man rose from a private
station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to fortune but
opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him for their captain, afterwards
he was rewarded by being made their prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private
citizen, that one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king.
This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old alliances, made new
ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on such foundations he was able to build
any edifice: thus, whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in
keeping. |
| What obstacles do these rulers face? |
[58] CHAPTER VII CONCERNING
NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE |
|
[59] THOSE who solely by
good fortune become princes from being private citizens have little trouble in rising, but
much in keeping atop; they have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but
they have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state is given
either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as happened to many in Greece, in
the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order
that they might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those
emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens came to empire. Such
stand simply upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated them -- two most
inconstant and unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the
position; because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not reasonable to
expect that they should know how to command, having always lived in a private condition;
besides, they cannot hold it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and
faithful. |
|
[60] States that rise
unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature which are born and grow rapidly,
cannot have their foundations and relations with other states fixed in such a way that the
first storm will not overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become
princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be prepared at once to hold
that which fortune has thrown into their laps, and that those foundations, which others
have laid before they became princes, they must lay afterwards. |
| What brought down Cesare Borgia? |
[61] Concerning these two
methods of rising to be a prince by ability or fortune, I wish to adduce two examples
within our own recollection, and these are Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco,
by proper means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be Duke of
Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties he kept with little
trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired
his state during the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it,
notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a
wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and fortunes of
others had bestowed on him. |
|
[62] Because, as is stated
above, he who has not first laid his foundations may be able with great ability to lay
them afterwards, but they will be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the
building. If, therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be seen
that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not consider it superfluous
to discuss them, because I do not know what better precepts to give a new prince than the
example of his actions; and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault,
but the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune. |
| Note the obstacles Alexander overcomes. |
[63] Alexander VI, in
wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had many immediate and prospective difficulties.
Firstly, he did not see his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of
the Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke of Milan and the
Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were already under the protection
of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he
might have been assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, namely,
the Orsini and the Colonna and their following. It behoved him, therefore, to upset this
state of affairs and embroil the powers, so as to make himself securely master of part of
their states. This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other
reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would not only not oppose this,
but he would render it more easy by dissolving the former marriage of King Louis.
Therefore the king came into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of
Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the attempt
on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the king. The duke, therefore,
having acquired the Romagna and beaten the Colonna, while wishing to hold that and to
advance further, was hindered by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to
him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that the forces of the
Orsini, which was using, would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder him from
winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and that the King might also do
the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna,
he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind
when he himself, after taking the duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him
desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided to depend no more upon the arms and
the luck of others. |
|
[64] For the first thing he
weakened the Orsini and Colonna parties in Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents
who were gentlemen, making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to
their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that in a few months all
attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned entirely to the duke. After this he
awaited an opportunity to crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna.
This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length that the
aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them, called a meeting at Magione,
in the territory of Perugia. From this sprung the rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in
the Romagna, with endless dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of
the French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by trusting either to
the French or other outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew so well how
to conceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor Paolo [Orsini] -- whom the duke did
not fail to secure with all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses --
the Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his power at
Sinigaglia. Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their partisans into his friends,
the duke had laid sufficiently good foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and
the duchy of Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he
gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice, and to be imitated
by others, I am not willing to leave it out. |
|
[65] When the duke occupied
the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak masters, who rather plundered their
subjects than ruled them, and gave them more cause for disunion than for union, so that
the country was full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing to
bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it necessary to give it a good
governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer Ramiro d'Orco [de Lorqua], a swift and cruel man,
to whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with
the greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not advisable to confer
such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set
up a court of judgment in the country, under a most excellent president, wherein all
cities had their advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some
hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them
entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been practised, it had
not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence
he took Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the piazza at Cesena
with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the
people to be at once satisfied and dismayed. |
|
[66] But let us return
whence we started. I say that the duke, finding himself now sufficiently powerful and
partly secured from immediate dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having
in a great measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he wished
to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France, for he knew that the king, who
too late was aware of his mistake, would not support him. And from this time he began to
seek new alliances and to temporize with France in the expedition which she was making
towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It was his
intention to secure himself against them, and this he would have quickly accomplished had
Alexander lived. Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future
he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church might not be
friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which Alexander had given him, so he
decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by exterminating the families of those lords whom he
had despoiled, so as to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to
himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope with their aid, as
has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the college more to himself. Fourthly, by
acquiring so much power before the Pope should die that he could by his own measures
resist the first shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he had
accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed lords as he could lay
hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most
numerous party in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become
master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his
protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for the French were already driven
out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy
his goodwill), he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once,
partly through hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the Florentines
would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that
Alexander died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would have stood
by himself, and no longer have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely
on his own power and ability. |
|
[67] But Alexander died five
years after he had first drawn the sword. He left the duke with the state of Romagna alone
consolidated, with the rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick
unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew so well how
men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the foundations which in so short a time he
had laid, that if he had not had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good
health, he would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his foundations were
good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a month. In Rome, although but half alive,
he remained secure; and whilst the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to
Rome, they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope him whom
he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not have been elected. But if he
had been in sound health at the death of Alexander, everything would have been easy to
him. On the day that Julius II was elected, he told me that he had thought of everything
that might occur at the death of his father, and had provided a remedy for all, except
that he had never anticipated that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the
point to die. |
| Note contrasting skills required to
succeed. |
[68] When all the actions of
the duke are recalled, I do not know how to blame him, but rather it appears to me, as I
have said, that I ought to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the
arms of others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and
far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and only the shortness
of the life of Alexander and his own sickness frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who
considers it necessary to secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to
overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the people, to be
followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate those who have power or reason to
hurt him, to change the old order of things for new, to be severe and gracious,
magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain
friendship with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal and
offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this man. |
|
[69] Only can he be blamed
for the election of Julius II, in whom he made a bad choice, because, as is said, not
being able to elect a Pope to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being
elected Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any cardinal whom he
had injured or who had cause to fear him if they became pontiffs. For men injure either
from fear or hatred. Those whom he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad
Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio. [1] Any one of the others, on becoming Pope,
would have had to fear him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their
relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the kingdom of France having
relations with him. Therefore, above everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard
Pope, and, failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad Vincula.
He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages to forget old injuries is
deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate
ruin. |
|
[70] 1. Julius II had been
Cardinal of San Pietro ad Vincula; San Giorgio was Raffaells Riaxis, and Ascanio was
Cardinal Ascanio Sforza. |
| Does he approve of this means of attaining
power? |
[71] CHAPTER VIII CONCERNING
THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS |
|
[72] ALTHOUGH a prince may
rise from a private station in two ways, neither of which can be entirely attributed to
fortune or genius, yet it is manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although
one could be more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are when,
either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the principality, or when by the
favour of his fellow-citizens a private person becomes the prince of his country. And
speaking of the first method, it will be illustrated by two examples -- one ancient, the
other modern -- and without entering further into the subject, I consider these two
examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them. |
|
[73] Agathocles, the
Sicilian, became King of Syracuse not only from a private but from a low and abject
position. This man, the son of a potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always
led an infamous life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of
mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession, he rose through its
ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established in that position, and having
deliberately resolved to make himself prince and to seize by violence, without obligation
to others, that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding for
this purpose with Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, was fighting in Sicily.
One morning he assembled the people and senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with
them things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the
senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held the princedom of
that city without any civil commotion. And although he was twice routed by the
Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his city, but
leaving part of his men for its defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a
short time raised the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity,
were compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to be
content with the possession of Africa. |
| What does he think of Agathocles? |
[74] Therefore, he who
considers the actions and the genius of this man will see nothing, or little, which can be
attributed to fortune, inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the
favour of any one, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were gained
with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly held by him with many
hazards and dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive
friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain
empire, but not glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and
extricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his greatness of mind in
enduring overcoming hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less than the
most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite
wickednesses do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent men. What he
achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or to genius. |
|
[75] In our times, during
the rule of Alexander VI, Oliverotto da Fermo, having been left an orphan many years
before, was brought up by his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of
his youth sent to fight under Paolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his discipline, he
might attain some high position in the military profession. After Paolo died, he fought
under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a
vigorous body and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing to him
a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some citizens of Fermo,
to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than its liberty, and with the help of the
Vitelli, to seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home
for many years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some measure to look into his
patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in
order that the citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to come
honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers;
and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably by the citizens
of Fermo, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also to that of Giovanni
himself, who had brought him up. |
|
[76] Giovanni, therefore,
did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, and he caused him to be honourably
received by the Fermans, and he lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some
days, and having arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a
solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of Fermo. When the
viands and all the other entertainments that are usual in such banquets were finished,
Oliverotto artfully began certain grave discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope
Alexander and his son Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and
others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to be discussed in a
more private place, and he betook himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of
the citizens went in after him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued from
secret places and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto,
mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief magistrate in the
palace, so that in fear the people were forced to obey him, and to form a government, of
which he made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able to injure
him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a way that,
in the year during which he held the principality, not only was he secure in the city of
Fermo, but he had become formidable to all his neighbours. And his destruction would have
been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by
Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigaglia, as was stated
above. Thus one year after he had committed this parricide, he was strangled, together
with Vitellozzo, whom he had made his leader in valour and wickedness. |
| When is cruelty well or poorly used? |
[77] Some may wonder how it
can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after infinite treacheries and cruelties, should
live for long secure in his country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never
be conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by means of cruelty,
have never been able even in peaceful times to hold the state, still less in the doubtful
times of war. I believe that this follows from severities being badly or properly used.
Those may be called properly used, if of evil it is lawful to speak well, that are applied
at one blow and are necessary to one's security, and that are not persisted in afterwards
unless they can be turned to the advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those
which, notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than
decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God or man, to mitigate
in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is impossible for those who follow the
other to maintain themselves. |
|
[78] Hence it is to be
remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought to examine closely into all those
injuries which it is necessary for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as
not to have to repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to
reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise, either from
timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in his hand; neither can he
rely on his subjects, nor can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and
repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted
less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given little by little, so that the flavour
of them may last longer. |
|
[79] And above all things, a
prince ought to live amongst his people in such a way that no unexpected circumstances,
whether of good or evil, shall make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in
troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help you, for
they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be under any obligation to you
for them. |
| What determines success in ruling a
democracy? |
[80] CHAPTER IX CONCERNING A
CIVIL PRINCIPALITY |
|
[81] BUT coming to the other
point -- where a leading citizen becomes the prince of his country, not by wickedness or
any intolerable violence, but by the favour of his fellow citizens -- this may be called a
civil principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but
rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality is obtained either by the
favour of the people or by the favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two
distinct parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be
ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people; and
from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of three results, either a
principality, self-government, or anarchy. |
| Is it better to be supported by the nobles
or the people? |
[82] A principality is
created either by the people or by the nobles, accordingly as one or other of them has the
opportunity; for the nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the
reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his shadow they
can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding they cannot resist the nobles, also
cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by
his authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains
himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of the people, because the
former finds himself with many around him who consider themselves his equals, and because
of this he can neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches sovereignty
by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around him, or few, who are not
prepared to obey him. |
| What do the people want? |
[83] Besides this, one
cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you can
satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter
wishing to oppress, whilst the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added
also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because of their
being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself, as they are few in number.
The worst that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but
from hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise
against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always come
forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect to
prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the same people, but he can
do well without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and to give or
take away authority when it pleases him. |
|
[84] Therefore, to make this
point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to
say, they either shape their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune,
or they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be honoured
and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in two ways; they may fail
to do this through pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you ought to
make use of them, especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in
prosperity you honour yourself, in adversity you have not to fear them. But when for their
own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that they are giving more
thought to themselves than to you, and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear
them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him. |
|
[85] Therefore, one who
becomes a prince through the favour of the people ought to keep them friendly, and this he
can easily do seeing they only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition
to the people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above everything, to
seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may easily do if he takes them under
his protection. Because men, when they receive good from him of whom they were expecting
evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more
devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their favours; and the
prince can win their affections in many ways, but as these vary according to the
circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary
for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity. |
|
[86] Nabis, Prince of the
Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, and of a victorious Roman army, and against
them he defended his country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it
was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this would not have
been sufficient if the people had been hostile. And do not let any one impugn this
statement with the trite proverb that 'He who builds on the people, builds on the mud,'
for this is true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself
that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates;
wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and
to Messer Giorgio Scali in Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as
above, who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not
fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole
people encouraged -- such a one will never find himself deceived in them, and it will be
shown that he has laid his foundations well. |
| Why is this a dangerous time? |
[87] These principalities
are liable to danger when they are passing from the civil to the absolute order of
government, for such princes either rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter
case their government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the
goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially in
troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either by intrigue or open
defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority,
because the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not
of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will always be in doubtful times a
scarcity of men whom he can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in
quiet times, when citizens had need of the state, because then every one agrees with him;
they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to die for him; but in
troubled times, when the state has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so
much the more is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once.
Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will always in
every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he will
always find them faithful. |
| What's the best defense? |
[88] CHAPTER X CONCERNING
THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED |
|
[89] IT IS necessary to
consider another point in examining the character of these principalities: that is,
whether a prince has such power that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own
resources, or whether he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this
quite clear I say that I consider those are able to support themselves by their own
resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise a sufficient army to join
battle against any one who comes to attack them; and I consider those always to have need
of others who cannot show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to
defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been discussed, but we
will speak of it again should it recur. In the second case one can say nothing except to
encourage such princes to provision and fortify their towns, and not on any account to
defend the country. And whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the
other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often repeated, will
never be attacked without great caution, for men are always adverse to enterprises where
difficulties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who
has his town well fortified, and is not hated by his people. |
|
[90] The cities of Germany
are absolutely free, they own but little country around them, and they yield obedience to
the emperor when it suits them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have
near them, because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the taking of
them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they have proper ditches and walls,
they have sufficient artillery, and they always keep in public depots enough for one
year's eating, drinking, and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without
loss to the state, they always have the means of giving work to the community in those
labours that are the life and strength of the city, and on the pursuit of which the people
are supported; they also hold military exercises in repute, and moreover have many
ordinances to uphold them. |
|
[91] Therefore, a prince who
has a strong city, and had not made himself odious, will not be attacked, or if any one
should attack he will only be driven off with disgrace; again, because that affairs of
this world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole year in the
field without being interfered with. And whoever should reply: If the people have property
outside the city, and see it burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and
self-interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer that a powerful and
courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by giving at one time hope to his
subjects that the evil will not be for long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the
enemy, then preserving himself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be too
bold. |
|
[92] Further, the enemy
would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin the country at the time when the
spirits of the people are still hot and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the
less ought the prince to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the
damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer any remedy; and
therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with their prince, he appearing to be
under obligations to them now that their houses have been burnt and their possessions
ruined in his defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they confer
as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is well considered, it wilt not
be difficult for a wise prince to keep the minds of his citizens steadfast from first to
last, when he does not fail to support and defend them. |
| What makes these states so strong? |
[93] CHAPTER XI CONCERNING
ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES |
|
[94] IT ONLY remains now to
speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching which all difficulties are prior to
getting possession, because they are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they
can be held without either; for they are sustained by the ordinances of religion, which
are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the principalities may be held no matter
how their princes behave and live. These princes alone have states and do not defend them,
they have subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are not taken
from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, and they have neither the
desire nor the ability to alienate themselves. Such principalities only are secure and
happy. But being upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak no
more of them, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the act of a
presumptuous and rash man to discuss them. |
|
[95] Nevertheless, if any
one should ask of me how comes it that the Church has attained such greatness in temporal
power, seeing that from Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who
have been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) have valued
the temporal power very slightly -- yet now a king of France trembles before it, and it
has been able to drive him from Italy, and to ruin the Venetians -- although this may be
very manifest, it does not appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to
memory. |
|
[96] Before Charles, King of
France, passed into Italy, this country was under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians,
the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two
principal anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; the other,
that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those about whom there was the most
anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. To restrain the Venetians the union of all the
others was necessary, as it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they
made use of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini and Colonna,
had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with arms in their hands under the eyes
of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and powerless. And although there might arise
sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus [IV], yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid
him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also a cause of weakness; for in
the ten years, which is the average life of a pope, he can with difficulty lower one of
the factions; and if, so to speak, one pope should almost destroy the Colonna, another
would arise hostile to the Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet would not
have time to ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were
little esteemed in Italy. |
|
[97] Alexander VI arose
afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have ever been showed how a pope with both money
and arms was able to prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and
by reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things which I have
discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although his intention was not to
aggrandize the Church, but the duke, nevertheless, what he did contributed to the
greatness of the Church, which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir
to all his labours. |
|
[98] Pope Julius came
afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all the Romagna, the barons of Rome
reduced to impotence, and, through the chastisements Alexander, the factions wiped out; he
also found the way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been practised
before Alexander's time. Such things Julius not only followed, but improved upon, and he
intended to gain Bologna, to ruin the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All
of these enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit, inasmuch as
he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any private person. He kept also the
Orsini and Colonna factions within the bounds in which he found them; and although there
was among them some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: the
one, the greatness of the church, with which he terrified them; and the other, not
allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused the disorders among them. For
whenever these factions have their cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because
cardinals foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to
support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders and tumults among
the barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope Leo found the pontificate most powerful,
and it is to be hoped that, if others made it great in arms, he will make it still greater
and more venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues. |
| What does he think of mercenaries? |
[99] CHAPTER XII HOW MANY
KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES |
|
[100] HAVING discoursed
particularly on the characteristics of such principalities as in the beginning I proposed
to discuss, and having considered in some degree the causes of their being good or bad,
and having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and to hold them,
it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of offence and defence which belong
to each of them. |
| What is the relationship between laws and
arms? |
[101] We have seen above
how necessary it is for a prince to have his foundations well laid, otherwise it follows
of necessity he will go to ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old
or composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the
state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws. I
shall leave the laws out of the discussion and shall speak of the arms. |
|
[102] I say, therefore,
that the arms with which a prince defends his state are either his own, or they are
mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous;
and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for
they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends,
cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and
destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them,
and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping
the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die
for you. They are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war
comes they take themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble to
prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes
for many years on mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and appeared
valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus
it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in hand; [1]
and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the truth, but they were not
the sins he imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were the sins of
princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty. |
|
[103] I wish to demonstrate
further the infelicity of these arms. The mercenary captains are either capable men or
they are not; if they are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own
greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to your
intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are ruined in the usual way. |
|
[104] And if it be urged
that whoever is armed will act in the same way, whether mercenary or not, I reply that
when arms have to be resorted to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought
to go in person and perform the duty of captain; the republic has to send its citizens,
and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it ought to recall him, and
when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so that he does not leave the command. And
experience has shown princes and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress,
and mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to bring a republic,
armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its citizens than it is to bring one
armed with foreign arms. Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers
are completely armed and quite free. |
|
[105] Of ancient
mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who were oppressed by their
mercenary soldiers after the first war with the Romans, although the Carthaginians had
their own citizens for captains. After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was
made captain of their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their
liberty. |
|
[106] Duke Filippo being
dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against the Venetians, and he, having
overcome the enemy at Caravaggio, allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his
masters. His father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna of Naples, left her
unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms of the King of Aragon,
in order to save her kingdom. And if the Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their
dominions by these arms, and yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have
defended them, I reply that the Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for
of the able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not conquered, some
have been opposed, and others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not
conquer was Giovanni Acuto, [2] and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be
proved; but every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would have
stood at his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against him, so they watched
each other. Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the
kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while ago. The
Florentines appointed as their captain Paolo Vitelli, a most prudent man, who from a
private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can
deny that it would have been proper for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he
became the soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they held to
him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen
to have acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with
armed gentlemen and plebeians they did valiantly. This was before they turned to
enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they forsook this virtue and
followed the custom of Italy. And in the beginning of their expansion on land, through not
having much territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to fear
from their captains; but when they expanded, as under Carmignola, they had a taste of this
mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his
leadership), and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they feared
they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor
were they able, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had acquired,
they were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for
their captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the Count of Pitigliano,
and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened afterwards at
Vaila, where in one battle they lost that which in eight hundred years they had acquired
with so much trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed and
inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous. |
|
[107] And as with these
examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled for many years by mercenaries, I wish
to discuss them more seriously, in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one
may be better prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has
recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more temporal power,
and that Italy has been divided up into more states, for the reason that many of the great
cities took up arms against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were
oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain authority in temporal
power: in many others their citizens became princes. From this it came to pass that Italy
fell partly into the hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of
priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both commenced to enlist
foreigners. |
|
[108] The first who gave
renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio, a native of the Romagna. From the school of
this man sprang, among others, Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of
Italy. After these came all the other captains who till now have directed the arms of
Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been overrun by Charles,
robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Switzers. The principle that
has guided them has been, first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they might
increase their own. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory,
they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not give them any
authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a moderate force of which they were
maintained and honoured; and affairs were brought to such a pass that, in an army of
twenty thousand soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had,
besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their
soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking prisoners and liberating without ransom.
They did not attack towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments
at night; they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did they
campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their military rules, and
devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought
Italy to slavery and contempt. |
|
[109] 1. With which to
chalk up the billets for his soldiers. |
|
[110] 2. As Sir John
Hawkwood, the English leader of mercenaries, was called by the Italians. |
| What's worse about Auxiliaries? |
[111] CHAPTER XIII
CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE'S OWN |
|
[112] AUXILIARIES, which
are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince is called in with his forces to aid
and defend, as was done by Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the
enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to auxiliaries, and
stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain, for his assistance with men and arms. These arms
may be useful and good in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always
disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive. |
|
[113] And although ancient
histories may be full of examples, I do not wish to leave this recent one of Pope Julius
II, the peril of which cannot fall to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw
himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune brought about a
third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his rash choice; because, having
auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors
(against all expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not become
prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his auxiliaries, he having conquered by
other arms than theirs. |
|
[114] The Florentines,
being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran
more danger than at any other time of their troubles. |
|
[115] The Emperor of
Constantinople, to oppose his neighbours, sent ten thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the
war being finished, were not willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of
Greece to the infidels. |
|
[116] Therefore, let him
who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms, for they are much more hazardous than
mercenaries, because with them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield
obedience to others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better
opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one community, they are found
and paid by you, and a third party, which you have made their head, is not able all at
once to assume enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is
most dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided
these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose with them than to
conquer with others, not deeming that a real victory which is gained with the arms of
others. |
|
[117] I shall never
hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke entered the Romagna with
auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli;
but afterwards, such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries,
discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently, on
handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he destroyed and turned to
his own men. And the difference between one and the other of these forces can easily be
seen when one considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when he
had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he relied on his own
soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it ever increasing; he was
never esteemed more highly than when every one saw that he was complete master of his own
forces. |
|
[118] I was not intending
to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am unwilling to leave out Hiero, the
Syracusan, he being one of those I have named above. This man, as I have said, made head
of the army by the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like
our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him that he could neither keep
them nor let them go, he had them all cut to pieces, and afterwards made war with his own
forces and not with aliens. |
|
[119] I wish also to recall
to memory an instance from the Old Testament applicable to this subject. David offered
himself to Saul to fight with Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage,
Saul armed him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them on his
back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to meet the enemy with his
sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of others either fall from your back, or they
weigh you down, or they bind you fast. |
|
[120] Charles VII, the
father of King Louis XI, having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the
English, recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he
established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards his
son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake,
followed by others, is, as is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having
raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of his own
arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his men-at-arms he has
subordinated to others, for, being as they are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers,
it does not appear that they can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French
cannot stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come off well
against others. The armies of the French have thus become mixed, partly mercenary and
partly national, both of which arms together are much better than mercenaries alone or
auxiliaries alone, yet much inferior to one's own forces. And this example proves it, the
kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or
maintained. |
|
[121] But the scanty wisdom
of man, on entering into an affair which looks well at first, cannot discern the poison
that is hidden in it, as I have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a
principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not truly wise; and
this insight is given to few. And if the first disaster to the Roman Empire should be
examined, it will be found to have commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because
from that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour which
had raised it passed away to others. |
| What are the best kind of troops? |
[122] I conclude,
therefore, that no principality is secure without having its own forces; on the contrary,
it is entirely dependent on good fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would
defend it. And it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be
so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength. And one's own
forces are those which are composed either of subjects, citizens, or dependants; all
others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. And the way to take ready one's own forces will be
easily found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one will
consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and princes
have armed and organized themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself. |
| How should the Prince prepare? |
[123] CHAPTER XIV THAT
WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR |
|
[124] A PRINCE ought to
have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and its
rules and discipline; for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of
such force that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men
to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that when
princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have lost their states. And the first
cause of your losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a state is
to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being martial, from a private person
became Duke of Milan; and the sons, through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms,
from dukes became private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed brings you,
it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those ignominies against which a prince
ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. Because there is nothing proportionate
between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should
yield obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should be secure
among armed servants. Because, there being in the one disdain and in the other suspicion,
it is not possible for them to work well together. And therefore a prince who does not
understand the art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot
be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never, therefore, to have
out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace he should addict himself more to its
exercise than in war; this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study. |
|
[125] As regards action, he
ought above all things to keep his men well organized and drilled, to follow incessantly
the chase, by which he accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature
of localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the valleys open out, how
the plains lie, and to understand the nature of rivers and marshes, and in all this to
take the greatest care. Which knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know
his country, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by means of the
knowledge and observation of that locality, he understands with ease any other which it
may be necessary for him to study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and
rivers and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance to those
of other countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of one country one can easily
arrive at a knowledge of others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential
which it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to surprise his
enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the battle, to besiege towns to
advantage. |
|
[126] Philopoemen, Prince
of the Achaeans, among other praises which writers have bestowed on him, is commended
because in time of peace he never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when
he was in the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: "If the
enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here with our army, with whom
would be the advantage? How should one best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we
should wish to retreat, how ought we to set about it? If they should retreat, how ought we
to pursue?" And he would set forth to them, as he went, all the chances that could
befall an army; he would listen to their opinion and state his, confirming it with
reasons, so that by these continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war,
any unexpected circumstances that he could deal with. |
| Note what field the Prince should read. |
[127] But to exercise the
intellect the prince should read histories, and study there the actions of illustrious
men, to see how they have borne themselves in war, to examine the causes of their
victories and defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do
as an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been praised and famous
before him, and whose achievements and deeds he always kept in his mind, as it is said
Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads
the life of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of Scipio
how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, affability, humanity, and
liberality Scipio conformed to those things which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon.
A wise prince ought to observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle,
but increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be available to him
in adversity, so that if fortune changes it may find him prepared to resist her blows. |
|
[128] CHAPTER XV CONCERNING
THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED |
| Who is he referring to? |
[129] IT REMAINS now to see
what ought to be the rules of conduct for a prince towards subject and friends. And as I
know that many have written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in
mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart from the methods of
other people. But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful to him who
apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of a matter
than the imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities which in
fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one
ought to live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects
his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his professions
of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much that is evil. |
| How important is good behavior in a Prince? |
[130] Hence it is necessary
for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not
according to necessity. Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a
prince, and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are spoken of,
and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are remarkable for some of those
qualities which bring them either blame or praise; and thus it is that one is reputed
liberal, another miserly, using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our
language is still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call one miserly who
deprives himself too much of the use of his own); one is reputed generous, one rapacious;
one cruel, one compassionate; one faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and
cowardly, another bold and brave; one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another
chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another
frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know that every one
will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above
qualities that are considered good; but because they can neither be entirely possessed nor
observed, for human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be
sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those vices which would
lose him his state; and also to keep himself, if it be possible, from those which would
not lose him it; but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon himself
to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those
vices without which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is
considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if
followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed
brings him security and prosperity. |
| Which is better? |
[131] CHAPTER XVI
CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS |
|
[132] COMMENCING then with
the first of the above-named characteristics, I say that it would be well to be reputed
liberal. Nevertheless, liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the
reputation for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should be
exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach of its opposite.
Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid
no attribute of magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts all
his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to maintain the name of
liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax them, and do everything he can to get
money. This will soon make him odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little
valued by any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded few, he is
affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by whatever may be the first danger;
recognizing this himself, and wishing to draw back from it, he runs at once into the
reproach of being miserly. |
|
[133] Therefore, a prince,
not being able to exercise this virtue of liberality in such a way that it is recognized,
except to his cost, if he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for
in time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that with his economy
his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself against all attacks, and is able to
engage in enterprises without burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he
exercises liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, and
meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few. |
|
[134] We have not seen
great things done in our time except by those who have been considered mean; the rest have
failed. Pope Julius the Second was assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for
liberality, yet he did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King
of France; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax on his subjects,
for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long thriftiness. The present King of
Spain would not have undertaken or conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed
liberal. A prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that he can
defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he is not forced to become
rapacious, ought to hold of little account a reputation for being mean, for it is one of
those vices which will enable him to govern. |
|
[135] And if any one should
say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and many others have reached the highest
positions by having been liberal, and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a
prince in fact, or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is dangerous,
in the second it is very necessary to be considered liberal; and Caesar was one of those
who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome; but if he had survived after becoming so, and
had not moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if any one
should reply: Many have been princes, and have done great things with armies, who have
been considered very liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends that which is his own or his
subjects' or else that of others. In the first case he ought to be sparing, in the second
he ought not to neglect any opportunity for liberality. And to the price who goes forth
with his army, supporting it by pillage, sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs
to others, this liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by soldiers.
And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects' you can be a ready giver, as were
Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it does not take away your reputation if you
squander that of others, but adds to it; it is only squandering your own that injures you. |
|
[136] And there is nothing
wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst you exercise it you lose the power to do
so, and so become either poor or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and
hated. And a prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised and
hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to have a reputation for
meanness which brings reproach without hatred, than to be compelled through seeking a
reputation for liberality to incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred. |
| Well? |
[137] CHAPTER XVII
CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED |
|
[138] COMING now to the
other qualities mentioned above, I say that every prince ought to desire to be considered
clement and not cruel. Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency.
Cesare Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the Romagna,
unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if this be rightly considered, he
will be seen to have been much more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a
reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed. Therefore a prince, so long as
he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the reproach of cruelty; because
with a few examples he will be more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow
disorders to arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure
the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the
individual only. |
|
[139] And of all princes,
it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the imputation of cruelty, owing to new
states being full of dangers. Hence Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the
inhumanity of her reign owing to its being new, saying: |
|
[140] Res dura, et regni
novitas me talia cogunt Moliri, et late fines custode tueri. [1] |
|
[141] Nevertheless he ought
to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he himself show fear, but proceed in a
temperate manner with prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him
incautious and too much distrust render him intolerable. |
|
[142] Upon this a question
arises: whether it be better to be loved than feared or feared than loved? It may be
answered that one should wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in
one person, is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be
dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that they are
ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you succeed they are yours
entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life and children, as is said above,
when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And that
prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other precautions, is
ruined; because friendships that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or
nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need
cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one
who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the
baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves
you by a dread of punishment which never fails. |
| What's the worst thing a Prince can do? |
[143] Nevertheless a prince
ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred;
because he can endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be
as long as he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their
women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he must do
it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his
hands off the property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their
father than the loss of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking away the property
are never wanting; for he who has once begun to live by robbery will always find pretexts
for seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are more
difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince is with his army, and has under
control a multitude of soldiers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard the
reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army united or disposed to
its duties. |
|
[144] Among the wonderful
deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that having led an enormous army, composed of
many various races of men, to fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among
them or against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This arose from
nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his boundless valour, made him revered
and terrible in the sight of his soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues
were not sufficient to produce this effect. And shortsighted writers admire his deeds from
one point of view and from another condemn the principal cause of them. That it is true
his other virtues would not have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case of
Scipio, that most excellent man, not of his own times but within the memory of man,
against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose from nothing but his
too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers more licence than is consistent with
military discipline. For this he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called
the corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of Scipio,
yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate punished, owing
entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone in the Senate, wishing to excuse him,
said there were many men who knew much better how not to err than to correct the errors of
others. This disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have destroyed in
time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the control of the Senate, this
injurious characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed to his glory. |
|
[145] Returning to the
question of being feared or loved, I come to the conclusion that, men loving according to
their own will and fearing according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish
himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must endeavour
only to avoid hatred, as is noted. |
|
[146] 1. against my will,
my fate, A throne unsettled, and an infant state, Bid me defend my realms with all my
pow'rs, And guard with these severities my shores. |
|
[147] CHAPTER XVIII
CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH |
| What are the two methods of fighting? |
[148] EVERY one admits how
praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not with
craft. Nevertheless our experience has been that those princes who have done great things
have held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of
men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word. You must
know there are two ways of contesting, the one by the law, the other by force; the first
method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not
sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for
a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been
figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and many
other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his
discipline; which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who was half beast and
half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and
that one without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly
to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend
himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it is
necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who
rely simply on the lion do not understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord
cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and
when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good
this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you,
you too are not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince
legitimate reasons to excuse this nonobservance. Of this endless modern examples could be
given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void and of no effect
through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ the fox has
succeeded best. |
|
[149] But it is necessary
to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be a great pretender and
dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who
seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One
recent example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander VI did nothing else but deceive
men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he always found victims; for there never was
a man who had greater power in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing,
yet would observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to his
wishes, because he well understood this side of mankind. |
| How important is appearance versus reality? |
[150] Therefore it is
unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very
necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and
always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear
merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed
that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the
opposite. |
|
[151] And you have to
understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, cannot observe all those things for
which men are esteemed, being often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act
contrary to faith, friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him
to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune
force it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing
so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about it. |
| Most important quality? |
[152] For this reason a
prince ought to take care that he never lets anything slip from his lips that is not
replete with the above-named five qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears
him altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing more
necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judge generally more
by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in
touch with you. Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and
those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of
the state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which
it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result. |
|
[153] For that reason, let
a prince have the credit of conquering and holding his state, the means will always be
considered honest, and he will be praised by everybody because the vulgar are always taken
by what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are only the
vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have no ground to rest on. |
|
[154] One prince [1] of the
present time, whom it is not well to name, never preaches anything else but peace and good
faith, and to both he is most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived
him of reputation and kingdom many a time. |
|
[155] 1. Maximilian I, Holy
Roman Emperor. |
| How does the Prince avoid hate? |
[156] CHAPTER XIX THAT ONE
SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED |
|
[157] Now, concerning the
characteristics of which mention is made above, I have spoken of the more important ones,
the others I wish to discuss briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider,
as has been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him hated or
contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will have fulfilled his part, and
he need not fear any danger in other reproaches. |
|
[158] It makes him hated
above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, and to be a violator of the property
and women of his subjects, from both of which he must abstain. And when neither their
property nor honour is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to
contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways. |
|
[159] It makes him
contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute,
from all of which a prince should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to
show in his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his private
dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and maintain
himself in such reputation that no one can hope either to deceive him or to get round him. |
|
[160] That prince is highly
esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, and he who is highly esteemed is not
easily conspired against; for, provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and
revered by his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a prince
ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other from
without, on account of external powers. From the latter he is defended by being well armed
and having good allies, and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs
will always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they should have been
already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should affairs outside be disturbed, if he has
carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair,
he will resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did. |
| What does Machiavelli think of
conspiracies? |
[161] But concerning his
subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has only to fear that they will conspire
secretly, from which a prince can easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and
despised, and by keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for him
to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most efficacious remedies that a
prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people, for he
who conspires against a prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the
conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have the courage to take
such a course, for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite. And as
experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have been successful; because
he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he
believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you
have given him the material with which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can
look for every advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and
seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend, or a
thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith with you. |
|
[162] And, to reduce the
matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side of the conspirator, there is nothing
but fear, jealousy, prospect of punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince
there is the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and the
state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the popular goodwill, it is
impossible that any one should be so rash as to conspire. For whereas in general the
conspirator has to fear before the execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear
the sequel to the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and thus
cannot hope for any escape. |
|
[163] Endless examples
could be given on this subject, but I will be content with one, brought to pass within the
memory of our fathers. Messer Annibale Bentivoglio, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather
of the present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had conspired against
him, not one of his family survived but Messer Giovanni, who was in childhood: immediately
after his assassination the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from
the popular goodwill which the house of Bentivoglio enjoyed in those days in Bologna;
which was so great that, although none remained there after the death of Annibale who were
able to rule the state, the Bolognese, having information that there was one of the
Bentivoglio family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of a
blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of their city, and it was
ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the government. |
|
[164] For this reason I
consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of little account when his people hold
him in esteem; but when it is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to
fear everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have taken every
care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the people satisfied and
contented, for this is one of the most important objects a prince can have. |
| What is good about the French example? |
[165] Among the best
ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, and in it are found many good
institutions on which depend the liberty and security of the king; of these the first is
the parliament and its authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition
of the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit in their mouths would be
necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the hatred of the people,
founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to protect them, yet he was not anxious for
this to be the particular care of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he
would be liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people for
favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who could beat down the
great and favour the lesser without reproach to the king. Neither could you have a better
or a more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of security to the king and kingdom.
From this one can draw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs
of reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in their own hands. And
further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles, but not so as to make
himself hated by the people. |
|
[166] It may appear,
perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths of the Roman emperors that many of
them would be an example contrary to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and
showed great qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been
killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, to answer these
objections, I will recall the characters of some of the emperors, and will show that the
causes of their ruin were not different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will
only submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the
affairs of those times. |
|
[167] It seems to me
sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to the empire from Marcus the
philosopher down to Maximinus; they were Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian,
Severus and his son Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. |
| What was the conflict between the people
and the military in Rome? |
[168] There is first to
note that, whereas in other principalities the ambition of the nobles and the insolence of
the people only have to be contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in
having to put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset with
difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing to give satisfaction
both to soldiers and people; because the people loved peace, and for this reason they
loved the unaspiring prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold,
cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should exercise upon the
people, so that they could get double pay and give vent to their greed and cruelty. Hence
it arose that those emperors were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had
no great authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the principality,
recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours, were inclined to give
satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people. Which course was
necessary, because, as princes cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the
first place, to avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they
ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful.
Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had need of special favour adhered more
readily to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned out advantageous to them
or not, accordingly as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them. |
|
[169] From these causes it
arose that Marcus [Aurelius], Pertinax, and Alexander, being all men of modest life,
lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, and benignant, came to a sad end except
Marcus; he alone lived and died honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by
hereditary title, and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards,
being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept both orders in
their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nor despised. |
|
[170] But Pertinax was
created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, who, being accustomed to live
licentiously under Commodus, could not endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to
reduce them; thus, having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt
for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his administration. And here
it should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as by bad ones,
therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do
evil; for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain yourself
-- it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles -- you have to submit to its
humours and to gratify them, and then good works will do you harm. |
|
[171] But let us come to
Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, that among the other praises which are
accorded him is this, that in the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to
death by him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who allowed
himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the army conspired against him,
and murdered him. |
|
[172] Turning now to the
opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will
find them all cruel and rapacious -- men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate
to commit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except Severus, came to a
bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the soldiers friendly,
although the people were oppressed by him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made
him so much admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a
way astonished and awed and the former respectful and satisfied. And because the actions
of this man, as a new prince, were great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how to
counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a
prince to imitate. |
|
[173] Knowing the sloth of
the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it
would be right to go to Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the
praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to aspire to the throne, he
moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy before it was known that he had started. On his
arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After
this there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of the whole empire,
two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army, had caused himself
to be proclaimed emperor; the other in the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the
throne. And as he considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided
to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that, being elected emperor
by the Senate, he was willing to share that dignity with him and sent him the title of
Caesar; and, moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things were
accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger, and settled
oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus, little
recognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had by treachery sought to murder
him, and for this ingratitude he was compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him out
in France, and took from him his government and life. He who will, therefore, carefully
examine the actions of this man will find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox;
he will find him feared and respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need
not be wondered at that he, the new man, well, because his supreme renown always protected
him from that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his violence. |
|
[174] But his son Antoninus
was a most eminent man, and had very excellent qualities, which made him admirable in the
sight of the people and acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most
enduring of fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which caused him
to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and cruelties were so great and so
unheard of that, after endless single murders, he killed a large number of the people of
Rome and all those of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by
those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the midst of his army
by a centurion. And here it must be noted that such-like deaths, which are deliberately
inflicted with a resolved and desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any
one who does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the less because
they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he
employs or has around him in the service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care,
but had contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily threatened,
yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved
the emperor's ruin. |
|
[175] But let us come to
Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to hold the empire, for, being the son of
Marcus, he had inherited it, and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to
please his people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave himself up
to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he might indulge his rapacity upon
the people; on the other hand, not maintaining his dignity, often descending to the
theatre to compete with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the
imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party
and despised by the other, he was conspired against and killed. |
|
[176] It remains to discuss
the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike man, and the armies, being disgusted
with the effeminacy of Alexander, of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected
Maximinus to the throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated
and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought him into contempt
(it being well known to all, and considered a great indignity by every one), and the
other, his having at the accession to his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking
possession of the imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity
by having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many
cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to
fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome,
and all Italy conspired against him, to which may be added his own army: this latter,
besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his
cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him. |
|
[177] I do not wish to
discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being thoroughly contemptible, were
quickly wiped out; but I will bring this discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes
in our times have this difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a
far less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some indulgence, that is
soon done; none of these princes have armies that are veterans in the governance and
administration of provinces, as were the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was
then more necessary to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now
more necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people
rather than the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful. |
|
[178] From the above I have
excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him twelve infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry
on which depend the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that,
putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them his friends. The
kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in the hands of soldiers, follows again
that, without regard to the people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that
the state of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that it is like
the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an hereditary or a newly formed
principality; because the sons of the old prince not the heirs, but he who is elected to
that position by those who have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. And this
being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality, because there are none of
those difficulties in it that are met with in new ones; for although the prince is new,
the constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were
its hereditary lord. |
| The lesson from his examples? |
[179] But returning to the
subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will consider it will acknowledge that either
hatred or contempt has been fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized
also how it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in another,
only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones. Because it would
have been useless and dangerous for Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate
Marcus, who was heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly
destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated Severus, they not
having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new
to the principality, cannot imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to
follow those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which are necessary
to found his state, and from Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a state
that may already be stable and firm. |
| How important are fortresses? |
[180] CHAPTER XX ARE
FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? |
|
[181] 1. SOME princes, so
as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their subjects; others have kept their
subject towns by factions; others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have
laid themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of their
governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown and destroyed them. And
although one cannot give a final judgment on all one of these things unless one possesses
the particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will
speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit. |
|
[182] 2. There never was a
new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather when he has found them disarmed he has
always armed them, because, by arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were
distrusted become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your subjects
become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet when those whom you
do arm are benefited, the others can be handled more freely, and this difference in their
treatment, which they quite understand, makes the former your dependants, and the latter,
considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and service should have
the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you at once offend them by showing
that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these
opinions breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that
you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character already shown; even if they should be
good they would not be sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted
subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has always
distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a prince acquires a new state,
which he adds as a province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that
state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with
time and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters should be
managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who
in your old state were living near you. |
|
[183] 3. Our forefathers,
and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed to say that it was necessary to hold
Pistoia by factions and Pisa by fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in
some of their tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This may
have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way balanced, but I do not
believe that it can be accepted as a precept for to-day, because I do not believe that
factions can ever be of use; rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in
divided cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always assist the
outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. The Venetians, moved, as I
believe, by the above reasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their
tributary cities; and although they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they
nursed these disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their differences,
should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected,
because, after the rout at Vaila, one party at once took courage and seized the state.
Such methods argue, therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never
be permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the more easily to
manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but if war comes this policy proves
fallacious. |
|
[184] 4. Without doubt
princes become great when they overcome the difficulties and obstacles by which they are
confronted, and therefore fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great,
who has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes enemies to arise
and form designs against him, in order that he may have the opportunity of overcoming
them, and by them to mount higher, as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this
reason many consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to
foster some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown may rise
higher. |
|
[185] 5. Princes,
especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance in those men who in the
beginning of their rule were distrusted than among those who in the beginning were
trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been
distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies
so much with the individual; I will only say this, that those men who at the commencement
of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to
support themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they will be
tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very
necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them; and
thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in
too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not
fail to warn a prince, who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state, that he
must well consider the reasons which induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be
not a natural affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, then he
will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for it will be impossible
to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which can be
taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to
make friends of those men who were contented under the former government, and are
therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it, were favourable to
him and encouraged him to seize it. |
|
[186] 6. It has been a
custom with princes, in order to hold their states more securely, to build fortresses that
may serve as a bridle and bit to those who might design to work against them, and as a
place of refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been made use of
formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times has been seen to
demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he might keep that state; Guidubaldo,
Duke of Urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia,
razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that province, and considered that without
them it would be more difficult to lose it; the Bentivoglio returning to Bologna came to a
similar decision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if
they do you good in one way they injure you in another. And this question can be reasoned
thus: the prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build
fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the people ought to
leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make,
more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this reason
the best possible fortress is -- not to be hated by the people, because, although you may
hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if the people hate you, for there will
never be wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. It has not
been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, unless to the
Countess of Forli, when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she
was able to withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and thus
recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that time that the foreigners
could not assist the people. But fortresses were of little value to her afterwards when
Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners.
Therefore it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have been hated
by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these things considered then, I shall
praise him who builds fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever,
trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people. |
|
[187] CHAPTER XXI HOW A
PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN |
| What is the value of warfare to the state? |
[188] NOTHING makes a
prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting a fine example. We have in our
time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince,
because he has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be the
foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds you will find them all
great and some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada,
and this enterprise was the foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and
without any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile occupied in
thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations; thus they did not perceive that
by these means he was acquiring power and authority over them. He was able with the money
of the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the
foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him. Further, always using
religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with a pious
cruelty to driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more
admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa, he came
down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his achievements and designs have
always been great, and have kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and
occupied with the issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of the
other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against him. |
|
[189] Again, it much
assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal affairs, similar to those which are
related of Messer Bernabo da Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil
life doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some method of
rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. And a prince ought, above
all things, always to endeavour in every action to gain for himself the reputation of
being a great and remarkable man. |
| How should the Prince align the state with
others? |
[190] A prince is also
respected when he is either a true friend or a downright enemy, that to say, when, without
any reservation, he declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which
course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two of your
powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character that, if one of them
conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In either case it will always be more
advantageous for you to declare yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the
first case, if you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the
conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been conquered, and you will
have no reasons to offer, nor anything to protect or to shelter you. Because he who
conquers does not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he
who loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in hand, court his
fate. |
|
[191] Antiochus went into
Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive out the Romans. He sent envoys to the
Achaeans, who were friends of the Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the
other hand the Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed in
the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to stand neutral. To
this the Roman legate answered: "As for that which has been said, that it is better
and more advantageous for your state not to interfere in our war, nothing can be more
erroneous; because by not interfering you will be left, without favour or consideration,
the guerdon of the conqueror." Thus it will always happen that he who is not your
friend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to
declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, generally
follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when a prince declares himself
gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers,
although the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to
him, and there is established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless as to become
a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories after all are never so complete
that the victor must not show some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you
ally yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid you,
and you become companions in a fortune that may rise again. |
|
[192] In the second case,
when those who fight are of such a character that you have no anxiety as to who may
conquer, so much the more is it greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the
destruction of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved him;
and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not with your assistance, he remains at
your discretion. And here it is to be noted that a prince ought to take care never to make
an alliance with one more powerful than himself for the purpose of attacking others,
unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers you are at his
discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible being at the discretion of any
one. The Venetians joined with France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which
caused their ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to
the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then in such a
case, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favour one of the parties. |
| How can trouble best be dealt with? |
[193] Never let any
Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe courses; rather let it expect to have
to take very doubtful ones, because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks
to avoid one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in knowing how to
distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to take the lesser evil. |
| How should the Prince support the people? |
[194] A prince ought also
to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour the proficient in every art. At the
same time he should encourage his citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in
commerce and agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not be
deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away from him or
another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but the prince ought to offer rewards to
whoever wishes to do these things and designs in any way to honour his city or state. |
|
[195] Further, he ought to
entertain the people with festivals and spectacles at convenient seasons of the year; and
as every city is divided into guilds or into societies, he ought to hold such bodies in
esteem, and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of courtesy and
liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty of his rank, for this he must
never consent to abate in anything. |
|
[196] CHAPTER XXII
CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES |
| How do advisors reflect on the Prince? |
[197] THE choice of
servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they are good or not according to the
discrimination of the prince. And the first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of
his understanding, is by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable
and faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to recognize the
capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are otherwise one cannot form a good
opinion of him, for the prime error which he made was in choosing them. |
|
[198] There were none who
knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who
would not consider Pandolfo to be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant.
Because there are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; another
which appreciates what others comprehend; and a third which neither comprehends by itself
nor by the showing of others; the first is the most excellent, the second is good, the
third is useless. Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the first
rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know good or bad when it is
said and done, although he himself may not have the initiative, yet he can recognize the
good and the bad in his servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the
servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest. |
| How are advisors judged? |
[199] But to enable a
prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one test which never falls; when you see
the servant thinking more of his own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own
profit in everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever be able
to trust him; because he who has the state of another in his hands ought never to think of
himself, but always of his prince, and never pay any attention to matters in which the
prince is not concerned. |
|
[200] On the other to keep
his servant honest the prince ought to study him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him
kindnesses, sharing with him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that
he cannot stand alone, so that many honours not make him desire more, many riches make him
wish for more, and that many cares may make him dread changes. When, therefore, servants,
and princes towards servants, are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is
otherwise, the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other. |
| What sort of advice should the Prince seek? |
[201] CHAPTER XXIII HOW
FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED |
|
[202] I DO NOT wish to
leave out an important branch of this subject, for it is a danger from which princes are
with difficulty preserved, unless they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of
flatterers, of whom courts arc full, because men are so self-complacent in their own
affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with difficulty from
this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they run the danger of falling into
contempt. Because there is no other way of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting
men understand that to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell
you the truth, respect for you abates. |
|
[203] Therefore a wise
prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the wise men in his state, and giving to
them only the liberty of speaking the truth to him, and then only of those things of which
he inquires, and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen
to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With these councillors,
separately and collectively, he ought to carry himself in such a way that each of them
should know that, the more freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside
of these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in
his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or is so often
changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt. |
|
[204] I wish on this
subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of affairs to Maximilian, the
present emperor, speaking of his majesty, said: He consulted with no one, yet never got
his own way in anything. This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to
the above; for the emperor is a secretive man -- he does not communicate his designs to
any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in carrying them into effect they
become revealed and known, they are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around
him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he
does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he wishes or intends to
do, and no one can rely on his resolutions. |
|
[205] A prince, therefore,
ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes and not when others wish; he ought
rather to discourage every one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he
ought to be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things
of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has not told
him the truth, he should let his anger be felt. |
|
[206] And if there are some
who think that a prince who conveys an impression of his wisdom is not so through his own
ability, but through the good advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are
deceived, because this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise
himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his affairs entirely
to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well
governed, but it would not be for long, because such a governor would in a short time take
away his state from him. |
|
[207] But if a prince who
is not experienced should take counsel from more than one he will never get united
counsels, nor will he know how to unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his
own interests, and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through them.
And they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue to you unless
they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels,
whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the
prince from good counsels. |
| How have the Princes lost states? |
[208] CHAPTER XXIV THE
PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES |
|
[209] THE previous
suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince to appear well established, and
render him at once more secure and fixed in the state than if he had been long seated
there. For the actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an
hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far tighter
than ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the present than by the past, and
when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the
utmost defence for a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will be a double
glory to him to have established a new principality, and adorned and strengthened it with
good laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good example; so will it be a double
disgrace to him who, born a prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom. |
|
[210] And if those
seigniors are considered who have lost their states in Italy in our times, such as the
King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others, there will be found in them, firstly, one
common defect in regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in
the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the people hostile, or
if he has had the people friendly, he has not known how to secure the nobles. In the
absence of these defects states that have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot
be lost. |
|
[211] Philip of Macedon,
not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not
much territory compared to the greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet
being a warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, he sustained
the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the end he lost the dominion of some
cities, nevertheless he retained the kingdom. |
|
[212] Therefore, do not let
our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their principalities after so many years'
possession, but rather their own sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there
could be a change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm
against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they thought of flight and
not of defending themselves, and they hoped that the people, disgusted with the insolence
of the conquerors, would recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it
is very bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would never wish to
fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to restore you. This again
either does not happen, or, if it does, it will not be for your security, because that
deliverance is of no avail which does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable,
certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour. |
| How do we deal with the role of fortune? |
[213] CHAPTER XXV WHAT
FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS, AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER |
|
[214] IT is not unknown to
me how many men have had, and still have, the opinion that the affairs of the world are in
such wise governed by fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and
that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us believe that it is
not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let chance govern them. This opinion has
been more credited in our times because of the great changes in affairs which have been
seen, and may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes pondering
over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. Nevertheless, not to extinguish
our free will, I hold it to be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our
actions, but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less. |
|
[215] I compare her to one
of those raging rivers, which when in flood overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and
buildings, bearing away the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all
yield to its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, though its
nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when the weather becomes fair,
shall not make provision, both with defences and barriers, in such a manner that, rising
again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor
so dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour has not
prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where she knows that barriers and
defences have not been raised to constrain her. |
|
[216] And if you will
consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and which has given to them their
impulse, you will see it to be an open country without barriers and without any defence.
For if it had been defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either
this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it would not have come
at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning resistance to fortune in general. |
|
[217] But confining myself
more to the particular, I say that a prince may be seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow
without having shown any change of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises
firstly from causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince
who relies entirely upon fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that he will be
successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose
actions do not accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in
affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to
get there by various methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force, another
by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the
goal by a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one attain his end,
the other fail; and similarly, two men by different observances are equally successful,
the one being cautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than
whether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from
what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the same effect, and of two
working similarly, one attains his object and the other does not. |
|
[218] Changes in estate
also issue from this, for if, to one who governs himself with caution and patience, times
and affairs converge in such a way that his administration is successful, his fortune is
made; but if times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course of
action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know how to accommodate
himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him to,
and also because, having always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded
that it is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn
adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he changed his
conduct with the times fortune would not have changed. |
|
[219] Pope Julius II went
to work impetuously in all his affairs, and found the times and circumstances conform so
well to that line of action that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise
against Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The Venetians were not
agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he had the enterprise still under
discussion with the King of France; nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition
with his accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and the Venetians stand
irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the former from desire to recover all the
kingdom of Naples; on the other hand, he drew after him the King of France, because that
king, having observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend so as to
humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him soldiers without manifestly
offending him. Therefore Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other
pontiff with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome until he
could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed, as any other pontiff would
have done, he would never have succeeded. Because the King of France would have made a
thousand excuses, and the others would have raised a thousand fears. |
|
[220] I will leave his
other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they all succeeded, for the shortness of
his life did not let him experience the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which
required him to go cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have
deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him. |
| What does Machiavelli seem to think of
women? |
[221] I conclude therefore
that, fortune being changeful and mankind steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are
in agreement men are successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I
consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman,
and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it is seen
that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to
work more coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because
they are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her. |
| What is he trying to motivate Lorenzo to
do? |
[222] CHAPTER XXVI AN
EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS |
|
[223] HAVING carefully
considered the subject of the above discourses, and wondering within myself whether the
present times were propitious to a new prince, and whether there were the elements that
would give an opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of things
which would do honour to him and good to the people of this country, it appears to me that
so many things concur to favour a new prince that I never knew a time more fit than the
present. |
|
[224] And if, as I said, it
was necessary that the people of Israel should be captive so as to make manifest the
ability of Moses; that the Persians should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the
greatness of the soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate
the capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to discover the virtue of
an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy should be reduced to the extremity she is
now in, that she should be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the
Persians, more scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten,
despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation. |
|
[225] Although lately some
spark may have been shown by one, which made us think he was ordained by God for our
redemption, nevertheless it was afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune
rejected him; so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet heal her
wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of Lombardy, to the swindling and
taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, and cleanse those sores that for long have festered.
It is seen how she entreats God to send someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs
and barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready and willing to follow a
banner if only someone will raise it. |
|
[226] Nor is there to be
seen at present one in whom she can place more hope than in your illustrious house, with
its valour and fortune, favoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief,
and which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be difficult if you
will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the men I have named. And although they
were great and wonderful men, yet they were men, and each one of them had no more
opportunity than the present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor
easier than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours. |
|
[227] With us there is
great justice, because that war is just which is necessary, and arms are hallowed when
there is no other hope but in them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the
willingness is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those men to
whom I have directed your attention. Further than this, how extraordinarily the ways of
God have been manifested beyond example: the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the
rock has poured forth water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to your
greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do everything, and thus take
away our free will and that share of glory which belongs to us. |
|
[228] And it is not to be
wondered at if none of the above-named Italians have been able to accomplish all that is
expected from your illustrious house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so
many campaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, this has
happened because the old order of things was not good, and none of us have known how to
find a new one. And nothing honours a man more than to establish new laws and new
ordinances when he himself was newly risen. Such things when they are well founded and
dignified will make him revered and admired, and in Italy there are not wanting
opportunities to bring such into use in every form. |
|
[229] Here there is great
valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. Look attentively at the duels and the
hand-to-hand combats, how superior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety.
But when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs entirely from
the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are capable are not obedient, and each
one seems to himself to know, there having never been any one so distinguished above the
rest, either by valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. Hence it is that for so
long a time, and during so much fighting in the past twenty years, whenever there has been
an army wholly Italian, it has always given a poor account of itself; as witness Taro,
Alessandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestre. |
|
[230] If, therefore, your
illustrious house wishes to follow those remarkable men who have redeemed their country,
it is necessary before all things, as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be
provided with your own forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better
soldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they will be much better when they
find themselves commanded by their prince, honoured by him, and maintained at his expense.
Therefore it is necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be defended
against foreigners by Italian valour. |
|
[231] And although Swiss
and Spanish infantry may be considered very formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in
both, by reason of which a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be
relied upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the Switzers
are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in close combat. Owing to this, as has
been and may again be seen, the Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry, and the
Switzers are overthrown by infantry. And although a complete proof of this latter cannot
be shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of it at the battle of Ravenna, when the
Spanish infantry were confronted by German battalions, who follow the same tactics as the
Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility of body and with the aid of their shields, got in
under the pikes of the Germans and stood out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans
stood helpless, and, if the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been over with them.
It is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these infantries, to invent a new
one, which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry; this need not create a new
order of arms, but a variation upon the old. And these are the kind of improvements which
confer reputation and power upon a new prince. |
|
[232] This opportunity,
therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for letting Italy at last see her liberator
appear. Nor can one express the love with which he would be received in all those
provinces which have suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for
revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears. What door would be
closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him? What envy would hinder him? What Italian
would refuse him homage? To all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your
illustrious house take up this charge with that courage and hope with which all just
enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard our native country may be ennobled,
and under its auspices may be verified that saying of Petrarch: |
|
[233] Virtu contro al
Furore, Prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto: Che l'antico valore, Negli italici cuor
non e ancor morto. [1] |
|
[234] 1. Virtue against
fury shall advance the fight, And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight; For the old
Roman, valour is not dead, Nor in th' Italians' breasts extinguished. |